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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Larry Dean Corwin appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon
the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony driving under the influence and a
persistent violator enhancement, claiming, for the first time on appeal, that the
prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
While on patrol just after midnight, Deputy Darrell Meacham noticed an
oncoming truck with the high beams on, which the driver did not turn off as he
approached the deputy's patrol car. (Tr., p.187, L.20 - p.188, L.23.) As a result,
Deputy Meacham turned around for the purpose of making a traffic stop. (Tr.,
p.188, Ls.22-23.) Before activating his overhead lights, Deputy Meacham saw
the truck turn into a subdivision under construction where none of the houses
were occupied. (Tr., p.190, L.23 - p.191, L.6.) Deputy Meacham initiated the
traffic stop of the truck before it pulled back out of the subdivision. (Tr., p.248,
Ls.8-14.)
Deputy Meacham made contact with the driver ofJhe truck who identified
himself as Corwin. (Tr., p.193, Ls.1-20.) While Deputy Meacham was talking to
Corwin, he noticed Corwin's eyes were bloodshot and glassy, his speech was
slightly slurred and his movements were "fumbling." (Tr., p.198, Ls.7-11.) Based
on these observations, Deputy Meacham asked Corwin to perform field sobriety
tests.

(Tr., p.198, L.23 - p.199, L.2.)
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Corwin failed those tests and later

submitted to a breath test, which showed he had a blood alcohol content of
.083/.085. (Tr., pp.201-233.)
The state charged Corwin with driving under the influence and filed an
Information Part II alleging Corwin is a persistent violator. (#35305 R.1, pp.26-27,
36-38; R., pp.42-43.)

The case proceeded to trial after which the jury found

Corwin guilty of felony driving under the influence and found Corwin is a
persistent violator.

(R., pp.140-142.) The court imposed an enhanced unified

30-year sentence with 10 years fixed. (R., pp.186-189.) Corwin filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp.191-194.)
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The charges in this case were originally filed in 2007 and Corwin was convicted
in 2008. (R., pp.5-6.) Corwin appealed. (Idaho Supreme Court Docket No.
35305.) After Corwin filed his opening brief, the state and Corwin filed a
stipulation to vacate his judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new
trial. (Stipulation for Vacation of Judgment, Remand for a New Trial, and
Dismissal of Appeal, Docket No. 35305.) The ldahq Supreme Court granted the
relief requested in the stipulation. (Order to Vacate Judgment; Remand for New
Trial and Dismiss Appeal with Prejudice, Docket No. 35305.) The Reporter's
Transcript and Clerk's Record from Corwin's prior appeal has been augmented to
the record on appeal in this case. (R., p.2.)
2

ISSUE
Corwin states the issue on appeal as:
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, ns1ng to the level of a
fundamental error, during closing arguments when the prosecutor
mischaracterized Mr. Corwin's arguments, appealed to the passion
and prejudice of the jury, and misstated the law regarding the jury's
right to determine all facts relevant to the issues at trial?
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Corwin failed to establish he is entitled to relief based upon the
prosecutor's closing arguments to which he did not object?
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ARGUMENT
Corwin Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His
Unpreserved Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct
A.

Introduction
Corwin claims the prosecutor's closing remarks regarding Garwin's

performance on one of the field sobriety tests, which remarks were not objected
to, constituted misconduct amounting to fundamental error,
pp.14-17.)

(Appellant's Brief,

Review of the complained of remarks in context and under the

applicable legal standards shows no error, much less fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved

for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time
on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as
fundamental error. ~. 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.

C.

Corwin Has Failed To Establish Reversible Error In Relation To The
Prosecutor's Remarks In Rebuttal
Corwin contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing

argument by stating the following during rebuttal:
[Trial counsel] said -- I think I wrote this down right -- Mr.
Corwin was walking straight from his perspective, but not from the
officer's perspective. Even with all the evidence in this case, I'm
glad we're looking at this from the officer's perspective. From Mr.
Garwin's perspective, if that was a straight line, then we're all in
trouble because he had to -- when he fell off line, which is exactly
what we're talking about at that point, when he stepped off line by a
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foot, he did so to stop himself from falling over. So the line from his
point of view was crooked and careening down onto the ground.
That's -- that's not the type of line we want a driver to follow.
(Appellant's Brief, p.10 (quoting Trial Tr., p.370, Ls.4-17).)
Because Corwin did not object to the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, in
order to show he is entitled to reversal of his conviction based on the
prosecutor's comments, he must satisfy the three-part test articulated in Perry,
which governs claims of unobjected to constitutional error. That three-part test
requires Corwin to demonstrate that (1) "one or more of [his] unwaived
constitutional rights were violated"; (2) "the error [is] clear or obvious, without the
need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision";
and (3) "the error affected the [his] substantial rights," i.e., that it affected the
outcome of the trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Application of
this standard to Corwin's claims of unpreserved error demonstrates he has failed
to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled to reversal of his conviction.
According to Corwin, he has satisfied the first prong of the Perry test
because, he argues, the prosecutor's remarks "violated [his] constitutional right to
due process and to a jury determination on the facts in three ways." (Appellant's
Brief, p.10.) "First," Corwin argues, "the prosecutor in this case misstated [his]
actual arguments in his defense" by "impl[ying] that [he] was arguing to the jury
that they had to defer to his personal assessment of his performance during the
field sobriety tests in weighing the evidence of whether Mr. Corwin was
intoxicated." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Corwin claims that he "never argued that
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his own subjective assessment should control the jury's determination" but
instead "argued that the human element could have played a role in the officer's
assessment of Mr. Garwin's performance on this test - i.e., that it could have
been a matter of the officer's subjective perspective while observing Mr. Corwin
that he was not walking along a straight line." (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) This
assertion is not supported by the record. Garwin's entire argument on this point
was as follows:
Other examples of the human element, the state's already
alluded to some of them. During the walk and turn test, for
instance, the whole issue is did Mr. Corwin step off the line, and, if
so, how far, et cetera, but, of course, there wasn't any line. That's
a really good example of the human element because it's entirely
possible that Mr. Corwin was walking straight from his
perspective, but not walking straight from the officer's
perspective and there's just absolutely no way to determine who's
right and who's wrong in that situation.
(Tr., p.356, L.23 - p.357, L.9 (emphasis added).)
In response, the prosecutor basically quoted the highlighted language and
then said, "Even with all of the evidence in this case, I'm glad that we're looking
at this from the officer's perspective." Exactly how this "implied" to the jury that
Corwin "was arguing ... that they had to defer to his personal assessment of his
performance" is unclear. The comments, particularly when considered together
and in context, were an express rejection of Corwin's claim that the jury was
precluded from determining who was "right" and who was "wrong" about whether
he was able to walk a straight line because of the "possible" different
"perspectives." Urging the jury to reject Garwin's argument in this regard was
hardly improper, particularly since the only evidence before the jury was Deputy
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Meacham's perspective because Corwin did not testify. As such, there were no
differing "perspectives" for the jury to consider. 2

Corwin's claim that the

prosecutor "mischaracterized" his closing argument is belied by the record;
therefore, his contingent claim that the alleged mischaracterization violated his
constitutional rights necessarily fails.
Corwin next claims the prosecutor committed misconduct when, "after
implying that Mr. Corwin had argued that the jury should view the walk-and-turn
solely from his perspective," the prosecutor "asserted to the jury that, 'we're all in
trouble,' if they believed Mr. Corwin's argument."

(Appellant's Brief, p.11.)

Corwin asserts this statement "injected an appeal to the jury's fears if they
accepted the State's characterization of [his] defense." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.)
This argument fails for at least two reasons.

First, it is predicated on the

erroneous assertion that the prosecutor mischaracterized Corwin's closing
argument in the first instance. Second, the prosecutor never said "we're all in
trouble" if the jury "believed" Corwin's defense. What the prosecutor said was
"we're all in trouble" if, from Corwin's perspective, "that was a straight line"
because Corwin "stepped off line by a foot" so that "the line from his point of view
was crooked and careening down onto the ground," which is "not the type of line
we want a driver to follow." (Tr., p.370, Ls.9-17.) Contrary to Corwin's claims on
appeal, these comments did not "inject[ ] an impermissible appeal to the
passions and prejudice of jurors" (Appellant's Brief, p.11 ), but were a fair

2

Indeed, the only evidence of Corwin's "perspective" on his performance of the
field sobriety tests was his statement to Deputy Meacham that he failed the tests.
(Tr., p.209, Ls.18-20.)
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discussion of the evidence and a fair response to Coiwin's argument. State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) (citations omitted)
(noting that "both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the
jury and discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom" and that
a prosecutor's comments "must be evaluated in light of defense conduct and in
the context of the entire trial"); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179
(1986) ("[t]he prosecutors' comments must be evaluated in light of the defense
argument that preceded if').
Coiwin finally contends that "the prosecutor in this case impliedly argued
to the jury that they were required to defer to Officer Meacham's assessment of
Mr. Coiwin's performance on the field sobriety test, rather than to weigh the
import of this evidence on their own." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) More specifically.
Coiwin argues that the statement, "I'm glad we're looking at this from the officer's
perspective" was a "remark" that "impl[ied] that the jury was required to measure
and view Mr. Coiwin's performance on the field sobriety tests from the
perspective of Officer Meacham."

(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)

This was not

improper because the jury's evaluation of the evidence of Coiwin's performance
on the field sobriety tests was necessarily limited to Deputy Meacham's
testimony because there was no other evidence presented on how Coiwin
performed on those tests.

To the extent Coiwin is suggesting that the

prosecutor's arguments required the jury to simply accept Deputy Meacham's
testimony as true, such a claim is not supported by the record. Any such claim
also ignores the court's instructions to the jurors informing them that "as the sole
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judges of the facts, [they] must determine what evidence [to] believe and what
weight [to] attach to it" (R., p.148), they were to follow the court's instructions in
determining guilt (R., p.147), and that the arguments of counsel are not evidence
(R., p.144), and it ignores the legal presumption that the jurors followed those
instructions. State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718, 264 P.3d 54, 59 (2011)
(citation omitted) ("We presume that the jury followed the jury instructions given
by the trial court in reaching its verdict.").
Because Corwin has failed to establish the prosecutor's rebuttal remarks
were error, much less error of a constitutional magnitude, he has failed to satisfy
the first prong of Perry. Even if Corwin could overcome the first Perry hurdle, he
has failed to meet his burden with respect to either the second or third prongs.
Corwin contends the alleged errors "are plain from the face of the
appellate record and were not the result of any tactical decision on the part of
trial counsel in failing to object" because, he argues, he "received no tactical
benefit" from the prosecutor's statements.

(Appellant's Brief, p.14.)

argument misunderstands the plain error prong.

This

Whether Corwin feels he

"received [a] tactical benefit" from the prosecutor's closing argument is wholly
irrelevant to "whether the failure to object was a tactical decision." There could
be a number of reasons a defense attorney would not object to a prosecutor's
rebuttal remarks other than the remarks were not providing a "benefit" to the
defendant. 3 For example, perhaps defense counsel did not think the prosecutor

3

Indeed, it is probably a rare circumstance where a defendant receives a
"benefit" from the state's closing argument and an objection on this basis would
be frivolous.
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was mischaracterizing his argument, and he was surely in a better position to
judge that than appellate counsel. Defense counsel may also subscribe to the
belief that "[f]rom a strategic perspective," objections during closing argument
should be limited to only "the most egregious misstatements by opposing counsel
on the theory that the jury may construe their objections to be a sign of
desperation or hyper-technicality." United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1448
(9 th Cir. 1991 ).

'Whatever the actual explanation," it is not apparent on the

record, and, in any event, "Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)],
requires [the Court] to 'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."' Molina, 934 F.2d
at 1448. In short, prong two requires the Court to consider more than Corwin's
belief that the decision was not strategic because he did not "benefit" from the
prosecutor's comments and Corwin has failed to establish that the alleged errors
were "clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure
to object was a tactical decision."
Also relevant to prong two is the principle that "a court should not lightly
infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging
meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning
from the plethora of less damaging interpretations." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,
416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974); see also State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215
P.3d 414,439 (2009) (quoting Donnelly). Similarly, this Court should "not lightly
infer" constitutional error based on what Corwin believes the prosecutor "implied"
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by his arguments. (See, ~ . Appellant's Brief, pp.10 ("[t]he prosecutor implied
to the jury"); 12 ("the prosecutor in this case impliedly argued to the jury").) In
other words, claims based on implication cannot constitute plain error where, as
here, less damning interpretations are at least possible.
Regarding the final prong of Perry, Corwin argues the alleged error was
not harmless because, according to him, "the strength of the State's overall
evidence in this case was not overwhelming." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) As an
example, Corwin notes that "[a]lthough the State presented evidence of [his]
breath test for alcohol that registered amounts above the legal limit, his results
were only 0.083 and 0.085." and "a person's breath alcohol concentration varies
over the passage of time." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) This argument is without
merit.

In order to prove Corwin was driving under the influence based on his

blood alcohol content, the state was only required to prove that Corwin's breath
test results were .08 or above. I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a). The evidence that Corwin
exceeded .08 was "overwhelming" in that the breath results admitted at trial
exceeded .08 and were uncontradicted. Corwin's reliance on the notion that "a
person's breath alcohol concentration varies over the passage of time" in an
effort to undermine the evidence presented is unpersuasive because he cites no
evidence from which the jury could conclude that any delay in the administration
of those tests resulted in a higher blood alcohol content than he would have had
at the time he was arrested. To the contrary, if anything, the evidence supports
the conclusion that Corwin's blood alcohol content was higher at the time of his
arrest than when he provided the breath samples to Deputy Meacham.
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(Tr.,

p.282, L.23 - p.283, L.9 (noting, among other things, that when "you stop
drinking ... you start eliminating").)
Corwin also claims the state's evidence was "not overwhelming" because
he "exhibited no pattern of actual impairment in his driving other than his failure
to dim his high beams when passing the officer." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) This
is not entirely accurate. As noted by Deputy Meacham, consideration of Corwin's
driving pattern also included the fact that Corwin turned into an unoccupied
subdivision after Deputy Meacham turned around and started following him. (Tr.,
p.192, Ls.10-17.)
Even if Corwin's blood alcohol content and his driving pattern cannot be
considered "overwhelming," that is not the standard for showing reversible error.
The standard is whether the alleged error affected the outcome of the trial.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

It did not.

The remarks Corwin

complains about are limited to Corwin's performance on one of three field
sobriety tests.

Even if the jury felt improperly compelled by the prosecutor's

arguments to accept Deputy Meacham's conclusion that Corwin failed the walk
and turn test, that was not the only evidence demonstrating Corwin was guilty of
driving under the influence. In addition to the blood alcohol content and driving
pattern, which are not the subject of any claim of error, the state also presented
evidence that Corwin's performance on the horizontal gaze nystagmus and the
one leg stand, which are also not the source of any claimed error and which
indicated Corwin was driving under the influence.

(Tr., pp.201-204, 207-209.)

Add to this the evidence presented regarding Corwin's appearance and
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demeanor (Tr., p.198, Ls.4-11) and this Court can easily conclude that any error
associated with the prosecutor's comments on the walk and turn test did not
affect the outcome of the trial.

Corwin has failed to meet his burden of

establishing otherwise.
Because Corwin has failed to satisfy the three-part test articulated in
Perry, he is not entitled to reversal of his conviction.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Garwin's judgment of
conviction for felony driving under the influence with a persistent violator
enhancement.
DA TED this

ih day of June,

2012.

Attorney General
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